

THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE MILITARY FIELD

There is no evidence that the Soviet Union presently intends to follow a policy which in their view would involve the serious risk of nuclear war with the United States. They most certainly have a healthy respect for our present military capabilities and our great industrial potential. They recognize that nuclear war at this time would result in devastating damage to them. They probably question their present capability to deal a knockout blow and consequently would expect that their own devastation under retaliatory attack would be very great.

Comparative estimates of military strengths do not lie in my field of particular competence. This much I can say. I do not know of any American experts in the field whose views I respect, who take the position that today the Soviet Union has an overall military capability

superior to our own. I myself believe that today we have the military upper hand. What rightfully concerns us, however, ^{is the dynamic} are certain ~~moments~~ ^{growth} trends in Soviet military development, ~~further successes in the ballistic missile field~~ Further successes in the ballistic missile field would tend to change the nature of war and to make obsolete certain military weapons of the past.

The bow and arrow, gun powder, aviation, the tank, have in the course of history successively affected the conduct of war. As each development of this character came along the first tendency was to try to ignore ~~it~~ it or decry it. Any military establishment equipped with certain types of weapons and trained in their use resists the development of weapons which make obsolete those previously chosen after years of development effort.

Probably nothing is more distasteful to the strategist of today than the idea that wars could be fought with scientific gadgets propelled against an enemy from thousands of miles of distance. Wars, terrible as they have been in the past, have involved the elements of human bravery, of initiative, of high strategy and even chivalry. No military man likes to think that in the next generation these elements of his profession may be taken from it. The Cavalry and the battle ship died hard and no airman can be expected to have the same interest for a ballistic missile as he has in modern manned aircraft.

I am by no means suggesting that I take seriously Khrushchev's remark about treating aircraft as museum pieces. This quip was *partially* probably motivated by the desire to downgrade our own Strategic Air Command during a period when the Soviet might be planning to place more emphasis on the guided missile at the expense of the heavy bomber.

After all, we do not credit the Soviet with the industrial potential of developing at the same time and with equal priority and on a ~~massive scale~~ ^{armory.} massive scale all possible weapons in the modern military ~~army~~. They must make choices just as we. We do have some evidence, however, that as much as a decade ago the Soviet certainly turned to the guided missile as a challenging competitor to the bomber. What we badly needed back in 1945 after the Germans had opened the door to the future ^{missiles} of jet ~~propulsion~~ was a Billy Mitchell for ballistic missiles. Probably we should have sooner recognized what I believe the Soviet took into account at the end of World War II, was that the scientist has become a necessary partner to long range planning in the field of military weapons strategy. I have little doubt but that Soviet scientists had a major part ~~not~~ not only in the development but in the decision factors leading up to present Soviet competence in guided missiles.